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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.1 contains an explicit lesson and an
implicit warning. The lesson is that copyright law is overextended; the
warning is that the time has come to examine both the cause and the
effect of the overextension, and, by implication, to consider alternatives
Pope Brock Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
A special word of thanks is due Craig Joyce, who, with unfailing courtesy as always, read the
essay in manuscript and gave me the benefit of his keen insights..
I. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991).
*
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for protecting many works that copyright now shields from
competition.
The copyright statute today contains provisions for cable television, computer programs, compulsory licenses, royalty payments, sound
recordings, and live television programming,' all far removed from the
"writings" of "authors" that the Constitution empowers Congress
to
protect.' This overextension of copyright has resulted in an unacceptable increase of what I call the neo-copyright: copyright for works of
low authorship4 granted without regard to constitutional copyright policies. A classic example is the live telecast of a sporting event, such as
an NFL football game. However admirable the accomplishments of
athletes, their antics are hardly entitled to the claim of authorship.
This essay is a preliminary inquiry into why copyright law has
been so abused as to be extended beyond its rational boundaries and
what should be done about it. My thesis is twofold. First, the reason for,
the overextension of copyright is the ambiguous, and therefore infirm,
intellectual conception of copyright, which is a product of the dispute
as to whether copyright is the grant of a limited statutory monopoly or
the natural-law property right of the author. While the infirm intellectual foundation meant that there was no sound reason for extending the
copyright monopoly, it also meant that there was no sound reason for
not extending it. Therefore, practical reasons generated by self-interest
prevailed, and the copyright monopoly was extended.
Second, the infirm intellectual foundation derives from confusion
about the relationship of a work and its copyright. The original copyright statute in England-from which American copyright statutes are
descended-was based on the premise that the work and its copyright
ate two different things.' This distinction between the work and its
copyright, however, became blurred, giving rise to copyright protection
for low authorship works, i.e., the neo-copyright, without regard to
copyright policies mandated by the Constitution. Therefore, it is desirable to remove low authorship works from the copyright statute and protect them with a trade regulation act.
The real problem with this solution is that it necessarily, and indeed as part of its justification, requires withdrawing from neo-copy2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1988).
3. The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution states: "The Congress shall have
Power . . .To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." US.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
4. Professor Jane C. Ginsberg first used to term "low-authorship" works. Jane C. Ginsberg,
Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1865 (1990).
5. 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
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right works the generous benefits of copyright remedies. These remedies are so lucrative that neo-copyright entrepreneurs will cede them
only with great reluctance. And in view of their lobbying power, several
intellectual events must converge to make the alternative feasible.
There must be (1) an appreciation of the problem; (2) a conviction that
the neo-copyrights in fact are not constitutionally sound; (3) an understanding of the historical corruption of ideas whereby copyright as a
trade-regulation device came to be viewed as an author's property
right; and (4) an acceptance of the idea that low-authorship works
need-and are entitled to-only limited protection against competitors,
not plenary protection against users.
II.

THE PROBLEM

Copyright entails the power of both monopoly and censorship, and
the core copyright problem is information control. This is why there are
constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to enact copyright
legislation. And, this was the concern of Feist, for, the real subject of
Feist is not the white pages of telephone directories, but authorship.
Using the white pages as a vehicle, the Supreme Court rendered three
interrelated rulings: (1) copyright requires original authorship; (2) anyone has a constitutional right to use unoriginal materials contained
within a copyrighted work; and (3) a copyright owner's proof in an
infringement action must show the copying of components that are
original, rather than merely show copying. 6
The result of Feist's holdings is that the venerable sweat-of-thebrow doctrine, so long embraced by several lower federal courts, 7 is
unconstitutional. And because the only test of copyright for works of
low authorship is industry, the Court's rejection of the sweat-of-thebrow theory was also a rejection of the neo-copyright, although Justice
O'Connor did not use that term. For this reason, Feist may well prove
to be the Supreme Court's most important copyright decision since its
first, Wheaton v. Peters.'
The third ruling mentioned above-the copyright owner's duty to
prove that components taken are the product of original authorship--is
the most far reaching. This is because the ruling is predicated on the

6.' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., III S. Ct. 1282, 1287-97 (interim ed.
1991).
7. See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Jeweler's Circular
Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 38 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581
(1922).
8. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Having reestablished the requirement of original authorship
and constitutionalized the right to use unoriginal materials in Feist, the Court's next step may be
to constitutionalize fair use. (The learning purpose of copyright is a logical basis for giving the
constitutional
fair usebydoctrine
Published
eCommons,
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theory that copyright is the grant of a limited statutory monopoly
available only for works of true authorship. 9 With this point in mind,
some might argue that Feist utilizes the widely held misconception that
copyright is a natural-law property right of the author. But the argument is misplaced, both because the requirement of true authorship is
more a matter of limiting the monopoly than rewarding the author, and
because the natural-law theory of copyright is the source of the rejected sweat-of-the-brow doctrine.
This last point is explained by the fact that natural-law theory is
based on the idea that one is entitled to that which he or she creates.
Since the natural law does not distinguish between creation by head
and creation by hand, it follows that one who-creates a work by industrious collection is entitled to ownership no less than one who creates a
work by imagination. To every cow her calf, as an ancient Irish king is
supposed to have ruled, and the calf obviously was not a product of the
intellect.
The essence of copyright is that an author who has used words and
ideas as instruments of the mind so as to make a contribution to culture is entitled to be rewarded for his or her unique expressions for a
limited time with a regulated monopoly. One of Feist's lessons is that
the concept of copyright as merely another species of property is not
acceptable as a matter of constitutional law. The proper choice, which
Feist implies but does not articulate, is that copyright is a regulatory
concept, because it is a right granted by statute, i.e. positive law, to
serve the interest of three groups: authors, entrepreneurs (as disseminators), and users. 10 Yet, in American law, courts have consistently interpreted copyright statutes as giving copyright owners more protection
than the law allows. Since copyright owners were most often the assignees of the author (or the author-in-law under the work-for-hire doctrine), the courts thereby indirectly confirmed copyright as a naturallaw property right of the author.

9. Feist, Il1 S. Ct. at 1290-95.
10. The Supreme Court has said time and again that copyright is primarily to serve the
public interest, only secondarily to serve the author's. E.g., Sony of Am. Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975) ("[Tlhe ultimate aid [of the copyright law] is . . .to stimulate artistic creativity for
the general public good."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158' (1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration."); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."). From this it follows
that the rights of users are more important than the rights of authors or entrepreneurs. But this
could not be if copyright were a natural-law right, for that would make it a proprietary concept.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
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The positive-law/natural-law controversy, which took definitive
shape for Anglo-American law in the 1730s in England, continues because of the failure to distinguish between the work and its copyright in
the administration of copyright law. 1 1 The importance of the distinction
arises from the fact that the ownership of a work and the ownership of
its copyright are two different things. The separation of the two concepts is thus the key to the scope of the copyright owner's control: it is
one thing to control the use of the work (which the owner of the work
can do), but it is quite a different matter to be able to control only the
use of the copyright (which the owner of the copyright can do). The
point, perhaps, becomes less metaphysical when one realizes that to use
the copyright, it is necessary to use the work (for example, to sell copies); but to use the work (for example, in research), it is not necessary
to use the copyright. But, of course, if the work and its copyright are
deemed to be one, the owner of the copyright will control the use of the
work as well as the copyright.
The unitary concept of work and copyright, in short, makes copyright an ideal instrument of monopoly and a superior device of censorship in that it gives the copyright owner complete control of access to
the work. Certainly this was true of the early English copyright, the
stationers' copyright, which served both purposes extremely well. 12 My
point is supported by the fact that its successor copyright, the statutory
copyright of the Statute of Anne, destroyed this unitary basis by separating the work from its copyright with two provisions: (1) it limited
copyright to published books, which solved the censorship, i.e. control
of access, problem; and (2) it limited the term of exclusive publication,
which alleviated the monopoly problem."3
These two characteristics of copyright remained constant for over
two and a half centuries, from 1710, the date of the Statute of Anne, to
1976, the date of the fourth major revision of the American Copyright
Act, 4 when the first was eliminated and the second diluted so that the
limited term approximates a century. 5 Thus the recombination of a

I1. But analytically it is impossible to avoid the distinction: while there may be a work
without a copyright, there can be no copyright without a work, which must be fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. Thus, a work may continue to exist long after the copyright has expired.
Or, as Feist makes clear, there may be a copyrighted work that contains uncopyrightable material, which could not be if the work and the copyright were one property.
12. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 19 (1991).

13. 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
15. Id. § 302. A primary motivation for the change was almost surely a desire to pave the
way for the United States to join the Berne Convention. Adherence to Berne, however, poses a
subtle,
threat to 1991
the American theory of copyright as the grant of a limited statutory
real, ifby
Published
eCommons,
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work and its copyright received its most notable fruition in the 1976
Act.
A. The Codification of the Common-Law and the Performance
Copyrights
Although Congress utilized the distinction between a work and its
copyright, it limited the utility of that distinction with two radical innovations: the codification of the common-law copyright and of the performance copyright.
1. The Codification of the Common-Law Copyright
The common-law copyright, being merely the right of first publication, was not codified in the normal sense of the term. There is no
"common-law copyright" in the 1976 Act. But by. giving statutory
copyright existence from the moment of fixation-rather than publication-Congress in the 1976 Act usurped the domain of, and therefore
can be said to have codified, the common-law copyright. Congress
thereby-unwittingly, I think-provided a basis for eliminating the distinction between a work and its copyright.
The common-law copyright provided a basis for separating the
work from its copyright because it was not really a copyright at all; it
was a term signifying the ownership of a work that one had created.
(This is why the common-law copyright can best be viewed as a natural-law concept.) Thus ownership of the work itself can be attributed to
natural authors, but not to authors-in-law, that is, corporate authors
under the work-for-hire doctrine.
In theory, no one could make any use of the unpublished work
without the author's permission, and there was no copyright (the exclusive right of continued publication) to use. But the publication of a
work-which was required for statutory copyright-was deemed to result in a forfeiture of the common-law copyright, i.e., the ownership of
the work. Since the statutory copyright was only'a series of rights to
which a work was subject and existed only to protect the right to publish the work, that copyright could not be used to prohibit the use of
the work otherwise. Nor was there any need to do so. The use of the
work can be an offense only to the natural author. After publication,

monopoly. Since the dominating influence on Berne is the civil law countries, Berne in deed, if not
word, is based on the natural-law theory of copyright. Although the natural-law copyright had a
brief existence in eighteenth-century England in the form of the author's common law copyright,
it could not survive the fears of monopoly that it engendered. Thus, the author's common-law
copyright as a true copyright was short lived and it survived in name only-as the right of first
publication. All of this occurred prior to 1776, and the United States received the English copyright as a positive-law concept.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
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the author's right to the work was not offended by an individual's personal use of the work. Indeed, the personal use of a work for either
learning or pleasure is a compliment to the author.
The codification of the common-law copyright, however, implies
that statutory copyright also constitutes ownership of the work, and
that therefore there is no difference between the ownership of a work
and its copyright. If this is so, it follows that the copyright owner can
control the use of the work-even after publication-as well as the
copyright. Therefore, copyright owners can claim that the 1976 Act
changed the positive-law premise of copyright into a natural-law premise that supports their claim that copyright is a plenary property right
rather than the mere grant of a limited statutory monopoly.
For predominantly creative works by natural authors-a novel or
drama-this is not a real problem. For informational works and works
that contain much public-domain material, the problem is very real.
The problem arises from the fact that while copyrights are not fungible, courts tend to treat them as being so.
2.

The Codification of the Performance Copyright

The copyrights in the 1976 Act can be classified in two ways.
First, they can be classified as copyrights for "an original work of authorship," for a "derivative work," or for a "compilation."' 6 Second,
they can be classified as the publication copyright, the display copyright, and the performance copyright.' 7 While Congress enacted provisions to ensure that there is no overlap between the original, derivative,
and compilation copyrights, it is not clear that Congress considered the
problem as to the publication, display, and performance copyrights.
The publication copyright, of course, is the traditional copyright,
and the display copyright has only a limited impact. The important
innovation is the statutory performance copyright, which is placed on a
par with the publication copyright, and which has its origin in the common-law performance copyright that enabled the copyright owner to
perform a work without forfeiting it to the public domain. This feature
made the common-law copyright for such performance works as dramas a performance copyright, just as the statutory copyright (prior to
1978) was a publication copyright. When Congress in the 1976 Act
eliminated the common-law copyright for any work fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, it also made the common-law performance copy-

16. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103 (1988). Any copyrightable work has to be original, but the
degree of originality varies. Consequently, the scope of copyright protection is in direct proportion
to the amount of originality the work entails.
Published17.by Id.
eCommons,
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right into the statutory-performance copyright. The fact that distinguishes the performance copyright from the mere performance right is
that the former is no longer a mere right to which a published work is
subject.
Congress could have eliminated what is an anachronism in the television age-that performance is not publication-simply by equating
public performance with publication, which generically means "to
make public." The national legislature, however, did not do this, and
for the first time it granted a statutory copyright to enable the copyright owner to profit without requiring the quid pro quo of copies available for the public. 8 Congress thereby, for the first time in copyright
history, enabled the copyright owner to have complete control of access
to the copyrighted work while enjoying the benefits of statutory copyright. The change undermined the theory that copyright is the grant of
a limited monopoly and gave new impetus to the neo-copyright.
B.

Neo-Copyright and New Communication Technology

The codification of the common-law copyright and the commonlaw performance copyrights, of course, was prompted by new communication technology-the television and the computer-and with far
more consequential effects than were contemplated when the deed was
done. The development of a medium of mass communication almost
inevitably results in the development of a service industry. Indeed, the
printing press was such a development that led to copyright. The publication of books, and later, periodicals in the form of newspapers and
magazines, resulted in a service that provided the public with materials
of learning and information.
Originally, copyright provided protection for the product, not the
process itself, and modern copyright protection for the process was
delayed until television and the computer. Radio was developed, prospered, and passed through its golden age without any copyright protection for a live radio broadcast. Copyright for the script was protection
enough. With television, the scenario changed and copyright was given
to live, unscripted television broadcasts, such as sporting events. The
fiction that facilitated this use of copyright was that the recording of
the program as it was being broadcast resulted in an author's writing.
The arrival of the computer provided new opportunities for the extension of copyright protection in two respects. First, there was copyright protection to be had for the computer programs themselves, and

18. Until the 1976 Act, copyright required publication. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1909 Act, repealed). There was one minor exception. Id. § 12. Under the 1976 Act, copyright subsists from
the moment of fixation in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
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second, for the protection of computer databases. While Congress did
not grant protection for computer programs without requiring a substantial study of the problem, the precedent of printed databases, e.g.,
telephone directories, meant that there was no controversy over copyright for computer databases.
Electronic communication thus provided new impetus for the neocopyright. But little thought seems to have been given to either the
theoretical basis or the consequences of such copyright, and it will be
useful to consider both. The theoretical basis, of course, is natural-law
theory. The idea that one owns what he or she creates justified the use
of legal fictions to implement the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine.
The consequences of the neo-copyright are obvious, but given the
equitable premise of its natural-law basis, they are not apparent. The
two major consequences are: (1) the extension of copyright protection
beyond the primary, to the secondary, market; and (2) the inevitable
corollary, the entrepreneur's control of access to the copyrighted material. The consequences follow from the feature of electronic communication that distinguishes it from the printing press: it is a process for
performing, not publishing, works. Therefore, the primary focus of the
neo-copyright produced by electronic communication changed from
protecting the right to distribute copies of a work to protecting the
right to perform the work, thereby giving the copyright owner complete
control of access to the work.
Such control has three major effects: (1) to give the copyright
owner the power to impose a tax for using the work, i.e., a use tax (and
thereby adversely to affect the public's learning rights in much the
same way that a poll tax affected the public's voting rights); (2) to
provide an economic incentive for entrepreneurs to corral informational
material and create works of low authorship of a utilitarian nature
(and thereby to endanger the public domain); and (3) to encourage
judicial application of copyright-contrary to the Copyright Act-in a
manner to protect systems, for example, computer programs (and
thereby to enhance the copyright monopoly).
The power to impose a private copyright use tax has resulted in
three distinct forms of the neo-copyright: the performance copyright,
the performance/service copyright, and the performance/process copyright. The performance copyright (in the form of the performance
right) has been in existence since the 1897 amendment to the CopyPublished
eCommons,
1991
rightbyAct
giving the
copyright owners of musical compositions the right
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to perform them publicly,1 9 and it has been aggressively exercised since
the creation of ASCAP, organized in 1914 to collect royalties for the
performance of musical compositions. Perhaps the impact of this neocopyright is best demonstrated by the fact that the performance right
(now the performance copyright) apparently is not subject to the doctrine of fair use, which is supposed to be available regardless of the
type of work involved.
The performance/service copyright is a copyright for a service-Westlaw and Lexis are examples. While the nature of this copyright as a service copyright is obscured because the protection is ostensibly on the product and not the service, the databases of both consist
largely of legal decisions, which cannot be copyrighted. What is protected, then, is their selection, coordination, or arrangement. 2" But to
treat these acts as authorship for computer databases is a fiction.
Within the database there is no coordination or arrangement, and the
user makes the selection from a database that contains the universe for
the topic, for example, all the decisions of courts in the United States.
The fiction is justified to protect an entrepreneur for providing a service
that makes public-domain materials conveniently available. And the
ability to charge a fee each time one wishes to have access to the public-domain material is, in effect, a tax for their use.
The performance/process copyright is the neo-copyright that is
used to protect systems, e.g., computer programs-contrary to the provisions of the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court long ago rejected the
neo-copyright for systems in printed works, 2 but lower courts seem to
think that the ruling does not apply to works of new technology. 22 Consequently, the neo-copyright has been used to provide far more protection for computer programs than the law allows, probably because of a
lack of sophistication on the part of courts as to the intricacies of computer programs.
C.

The Threat to Constitutional Policies

As the Copyright Clause makes clear, the fundamental copyright
policies are three in number: to promote learning (the progress of science), to benefit the author (who gets the exclusive right), and to pro-

19. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1988). "Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be punished as provided in section
2319 of title 18." Id.
20. Id. § 101 (definition of compilation).
21. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
22. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). Cf. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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tect the public domain (copyright is available only for new works and
can exist only for a limited time). The neo-copyrights, by and large,
disdain each of these policies.
Since learning requires access to the materials to be learned, once
the materials have been made public, the constitutional policy requires
maximal public access to copyrighted materials consistent with reasonable incentives to authors. Yet the performance/service copyright requires the copyright owner's control of access, thereby enhancing the
copyright owner's power of censorship. Thus, both television broadcasts
and computer databases provide only limited access that, in each instance, is at the will of the copyright owner. Nor does the televising of
non-scripted events benefit the author, for there is no author; and in the
case of computer databases, the materials-facts or otherwise-therein
contained are sure to be in the public domain. (Information useful to a
large enough group to warrant an electronic database must be in the
public domain.) In any event, the copyright involved is usually the corporate copyright under the work-for-hire doctrine, with no human author as a copyright beneficiary. And, finally, the videotapes of live television broadcasts are often erased, thereby defeating the public domain.
The continual capture of facts and other public-domain materials to
add to computer databases produces a treadmill copyright that may
never come to an end.
The natural response to the claim of copyright unconstitutionality,
of course, is that lawmakers should not be handcuffed by an eighteenth
century document that historically has been read to have sufficient flexibility to accommodate changing conditions. The developments discussed above, it can be argued, are responses to changed conditions
that are in fact consistent with the goals of copyright. But the hidden
premise in such an argument-that the responses are consistent with
the constitutional goals of copyright-is not necessarily true, for the
responses have been made with the aid of legal fictions.
The major fictions that have facilitated the neo-copyright are: (1)
the work-for-hire doctrine, which can be-and has been-used to serve
the cause of the neo-copyright for low-authorship works by nonauthors;
(2) the "original work of authorship" fiction that, as a substitute for
"writings" in the Constitution, spreads the umbrella of copyright protection to informational and public-domain materials because the term
"work of authorship" is more generic than "writings"; and (3) the performance-is-not-publication fiction, as a result of which the media are
given a control of access that is inconsistent with the copyright's constitutional purpose, learning.
My point is as follows: rules that reach beyond the literal words of
the by
Copyright
Clause
Published
eCommons,
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of Congress so long as they are consistent with constitutional policies
and principles. The device by which this may be done is congruent legal fictions. No one, for example, should seriously contest the power of
Congress to grant copyright to the visual artist for paintings, even
though the wording of the Copyright Clause is "writings" and "authors." The painter is one who, by his or her own brush strokes, imparts original conceptions to the canvas, just as the author imparts his
or her intellectual conceptions to paper. The paint brush is analogous to
the quill-or pen, typewriter, or word processor-just as the canvas is
analogous to the parchment or paper.
The danger, of course, is incongruent legal fictions. The work-forhire fiction that gave rise to the corporate copyright is such. What language in the Copyright Clause, for example, supports the fiction that a
corporate entity-a legal fiction in itself-can properly be viewed as an
author?
The issues here sketched do not lend themselves to easy answers,
primarily because they are laden with self-interest concerns. That is
why an examination of the copyright clause in the context of history is
helpful, if not necessary. Viewing legal developments in a historical setting provides a perspective that the self-interest involved with contemporary concerns often denies us.
III.

THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER: THE MEANING OF THE
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE

The Copyright Clause is contained in the clause in the United
States Constitution concerning intellectual property, which reads: "The
Congress shall have Power . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 2 3 Because the clause encompasses both copyrights and patents, it needs to
be read distributively-the terms "useful arts," "inventors," and "discoveries" referring to patents, and the terms "science" (knowledge),
"authors," and "writings" to copyrights. Thus the Copyright Clause
essentially reads: "The Congress shall have Power . . .To promote the
Progress of Science .. .by securing for limited Times to Authors ...
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings . ..."
The clause is both elegant in phrasing and seemingly clear in
meaning, and so its interpretation has seldom, if ever, been a matter of
concern. The terms "authors," "writings" and "limited times" are sufficiently clear. An author was and is a person, writings were and are
what he or she produced with intellectual effort recorded by pen or
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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quill and ink, and limited times has the same meaning today as when
written. The term "science" in the phrase "progress of science" may
have changed its meaning, but all can agree that its eighteenth century
usage was learning, the meaning we give it today.
A.

The Meaning of "Exclusive Right"

The fact that the meanings of some terms are clear should not,
however, fool us into thinking that they are all clear. What does the
term "exclusive right" mean? The other terms are descriptive, but this
one is different, for it is the operative term: it is what Congress can
actually grant. Because the grant is so closely circumscribed, we need
to know the nature and scope of that right in order to know the constitutional limits of Congress' power to enact a copyright statute.
The source of the language for the Copyright Clause in all likelihood is the title of the Statute of Anne, the English Copyright Act of
1710, as can be shown by comparing the language of both. The Statute
of Anne provided as follows: "An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers
of such copies during the times therein mentioned." 4 The Constitution
reads: "To promote the Progress of Science ...by securing for limited
Times to Authors ...the exclusive Right to their ...Writings
-5
2....
Since the title was that of a statute and the Copyright Clause is
part of a grant of constitutional power to enact two types of statutes
(patent and copyright), the comparison of the two can most usefully be
made in terms of the ideas both contain: (1) the promotion of science
(the encouragement of learning); (2) exclusive right (copies); (3) author (authors or purchasers of such copies); (4) limited times (times
therein mentioned); and (5) writings (printed books).
The overarching idea in both is the promotion of learning-the
justification for the statutory grant of copyright that had proved in the
past to be both monopolistic and censorial in nature. But while the
Statute of Anne "vest[ed] copies of printed books in the authors or
purchasers of such copies during the times therein mentioned," the
Copyright Clause empowered Congress to secure "for limited Times to
Authors ...the exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . ." The
ideas are the same, but the wording is different-for good reason: the
Copyright Clause is in the intellectual property clause. Because it is,
the term "exclusive right" (instead of copies or copyrights) was used to
apply to both writings and inventions; "discoveries" was used in lieu of
inventions; and "writings" was used in lieu of printed books. Indeed,

24.

8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
8, cl.8.
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the only significant departure of ideas in the Copyright Clause from
those in the title of the Statute of Anne was the elimination of the
phrase "purchasers of such copies." This phrase was a euphemism for
booksellers-the only purchasers of copies-and their exclusion from
the Copyright Clause meant the deliberate exclusion of publishers as
26
the grantees of statutory copyright.
Given the light of history, then, the meaning of the "exclusive
right" that Congress can grant to authors emerges with surprising clarity. It means the right of the author to publish his or her writings. The
conclusion is one we can accept with confidence for three reasons: (1)
only by publication of a work is the progress of science promoted; (2)
marketing a writing by publication was the only way to gain a profit
from it; and (3) copyright, which developed in sixteenth century England for the express purpose of protecting the right of publication, had
the same purpose in eighteenth century England and in its former colonies. The right was "exclusive" because copyright was an "exclusive
right" of publication.
The argument that the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to
grant to authors only the right to publish their writings is thus consistent with the other limitations in the clause: promotion of learning, limited times, authors, and writings. Taken together, these limitations reflect three fundamental copyright policies: the promotion of learning;
the securing of the author's right of publication; and the protection of
the public domain.
B.

The Background of the Copyright Clause

The background of the language used, perhaps, is as helpful as
anything in giving meaning to copyright. This background, I have dealt
with in detail elsewhere, and for present purposes, it is necessary only
to concentrate on the fact that there were three copyrights relevant to
the choice of language. They were: (1) the stationers' copyright; (2) the
statutory copyright; and (3) the common-law copyright. The first was
the original copyright in England that came to be the basis of an opprobrious monopoly;. the second was the successor intended to destroy
the booksellers' monopoly and to prevent its recurrence; the third was

26. The English Parliament was an ongoing legislative body, the United States was a new
juridical entity being created, and the Constitution was to provide the limits of its power. Therefore, it made sense to exclude publishers from the grant of power to Congress to enact copyright
legislation. Common sense, if not past experience, would have indicated that in a free society,
publishers have an enormous amount of power, which in fact was later to be secured by the First
Amendment. Controlling the means of disseminating information, the publishers could prove to be
powerful lobbyists intent on shaping copyright law to their purposes, rather than the public good.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
The wisdom of the framers, however, has been undermined by the work-for-hire fiction.
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the product of the booksellers' efforts to override the statutory copyright with a judicial copyright.
1. The Stationers' Copyright
The stationers' copyright was a copyright purely and simply for
publishers, a product of the Stationers' Company, the London Company of the English booktrade, that was used as an instrument of monopoly and a device of censorship. The dates of its reign are approximately 1557 to 1694, the former being the year Philip and Mary
granted the Stationers' Company its royal charter, the latter the year
of the final expiration of the Licensing Act of 1662, which had been the
public law support of the stationer's copyright during its latter years. 7
The public had felt the pain of monopoly more than censorship (at
least in the later years), and resentment against the booksellers' monopoly was why it was some fifteen years before the booksellers could
obtain relief from Parliament to restore order to the booktrade. The
relief came in the form of the first parliamentary copyright act, the
Statute of Anne.
The relief, however, could not have been exactly what the booksellers wanted. The stationers' copyright had been effective as a device
of censorship and instrument of monopoly because it was available only
to members of the Stationers' Company; it existed in perpetuity; and it
did not require a new writing, for there was no correlation between the
creation of the work and ownership of the copyright. But the new
Copyright Act was in fact a trade regulation statute designed to preclude the use of copyright as a censorship device and intended to destroy and prevent the recurrence of the booksellers' monopoly.
2.

The Statutory Copyright

Several features of the Statute of Anne show its anti-monopolistic,
anti-censorship goals. First, it made copyright available to anyone entitled thereto-not just authors or stationers (but the booksellers continued their dominant role because authors assigned the copyright to
them). Second, and just as important as the general availability of
copyright, was its limitation to a term of fourteen years, with a like
renewal available to the author, if living at the end of the first term.
The bookseller, in short, had to obtain a second assignment if he was to
continue to own the copyright. A third feature of the Statute of Anne
was that it limited copyright to new writings, which meant both that

27. For a succinct history of copyright, see
(1992). For a more complete treatment, see L. RAY
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copyright could not be used to capture or recapture works already in
the public domain, and that new works would eventually go into the
public domain. A feature directed to the censorial use of the stationer's
copyright was a section providing that nothing in the act was to prevent
the importation of books printed in foreign languages beyond the seas
(such books had formerly been subject to the licenser's imprimatur).
And, finally, the statute contained a price control provision, whereby
one could complain if the price of books were too high. (There is a
certain irony here in that the officials to whom complaint about price
gouging could be made were generally the same officials who had
served as licensers under the Licensing Act of 1662.)
The important analytical distinction between the stationers' copyright and the statutory copyright, however, was that while the former
entailed both the work and its copyright, the latter separated the two.
In both instances, the reason was the same: the success of copyright's
monopoly and censorship roles depended upon treating the work and its
copyright as one. Thus the Statute of Anne separated the work from its
copyright by making the statutory copyright available only for published works, and by limiting the rights of the copyright owner to the
rights of publication and sale. In jurisprudential terms, copyright
ceased to be ownership of the work, and became only a series of rights
to which the work was subject.
3. The Common-Law Copyright
A commonly overlooked feature of the Statute of Anne-is that it
continued the old stationers' copyrights for a term of twenty-one years.
Although the new statutory copyright came into effect immediately, the
achievement of the anti-monopoly goal was to be delayed for at least
the period of time that the old copyrights existed. As long as its instrument remained viable, the monopoly continued. When the stationers'
copyright finally met its demise in 1731 (and after Parliament had refused the booksellers' request to revive it), the monopolists turned to
the courts to get judicial relief.
Their goal was to obtain judicial creation of an author's commonlaw copyright to override the statutory copyright, and their efforts required resort to natural-law theory because the statutory copyright was
a matter of positive law. Thus despite the absence of a common-law
tradition for copyright (the common law was supposed to exist from the
time when the memory of man runneth not to the contrary), the booksellers resorted to a common law based natural-law theory, claiming to
be acting in the cause of justice for the author. They argued that the
author who created the work deserved the ownership of it by reason of
natural law, which, being the basis for universal justice, was manifested
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
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in the common law. This ownership existed in perpetuity, and, of
course, could be assigned to the bookseller-in perpetuity.
The efforts of the booksellers resulted in a series of copyright cases
over a forty-year period, with which, except for two, we need not be
concerned. The important point for present purposes is that it was during this period that the notion of copyright as a natural-law property
right of the author developed, prospered, and achieved respectability,
although in the end it was accepted only in part because it was contrary to the copyright contained in the Statute of Anne. Consequently,
the common-law copyright was a copyright in name only.
The two significant cases were Millar v. Taylor28 and Donaldson
v. Beckett.2 9 Millar resolved the dispute over copyright as a naturallaw property right or the statutory grant of a monopoly in favor of the
natural-law property-right theory, by reason of which the author's common-law copyright existed in perpetuity. Millar, however, was only a
King's Bench decision; it was not appealed, and the issue went to the
House of Lords some five years later, where it finally ended in a compromise decision, Donaldson v. Beckett. That case held that the author,
indeed, does have a natural-law property, i.e., common-law copyright,
in the works that he or she creates, but that property lasts only until
the author publishes the work. After publication, the author has only
such rights as were granted by the Copyright Act. The common-law
copyright, in other words, was only the right of first publication.
While Millar can be said to be the origin of the common-law
copyright, the House of Lords' decision in Donaldson limited it. Because the Lords did not reject the common-law copyright altogether,
they made the natural-law property theory of copyright a part of English copyright jurisprudence that was transported to the new American nation.
C.

The .Two Copyrights and the Copyright Clause

The drafters of the Copyright Clause could have empowered Congress to grant two copyrights: (1) the statutory-publication copyright;
and (2) the common-law copyright. Although the statutory copyright
was the reason for-if not the source of-the common-law copyright,
the correlation between the progenitor and its product has been obscured for several reasons.
First, the usual custom is for common-law concepts to be codified,
but in this instance it was the statute that gave rise to the common-law
concept. This meant that the correlation between the ownership of the

28.
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1774).

Published by
257 (K.B.
98 Eng. Rep.1991
29. eCommons,

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:2

work and the copyright-Which had been no problem with the stationers' copyright-came after, not before, the creation of the statutory
copyright.
Second, it was the statutory-publication copyright, because of its
limited term, that posed the greatest threat to the monopoly of the
booktrade and to censorship. (The performance copyright, although it
could exist in perpetuity, was applicable only to one class of
works--dramas.) Consequently, it was the statutory-publication copyright that received all the attention. The relevant point, however, is
that of the two copyrights extant, the founding fathers gave Congress
the power to grant only one, the statutory-publication copyright. We do
not, of course, know the thinking behind the choice. And perhaps it
makes no difference, because we know the important point: the drafters
reached back over almost a century to the Statute of Anne for the language of the Copyright Clause. Our concern is whether this was conscious conduct that reflected goals the drafters had in mind. Three reasons suggest that it was.
First, the language of the Statute of Anne's title reflected goals
appropriate for a new nation: to promote learning, to benefit authors,
and to create and protect the public domain. Awareness of the English
experience with monopoly and censorship would have made the Framers fully cognizant of the fact that the anti-monopolistic, anti-censorship goals manifested in the title were carried out in the body of the
Statute of Anne.
Second, since the new government was to be a government of limited powers, it would have been inappropriate to give Congress the
power to grant to an author the property in his or her writings. The
author's property right had been recognized by the common-law courts
in England, and the common law was to be a matter for the states, not
the central government.
The third reason is related to the second. The copyright of the
Statute of Anne was a right to which a work was subject-it consisted
only of rights to print, reprint, publish, and vend the work. This meant
that there was a distinction between the work and the copyright, between the ownership of the work and the ownership of the copyright.
The book had to be published in order for copyright to come into existence, for the Statute of Anne had separated the work from the
copyright.
. Given the wisdom the Framers of the Constitution manifested
overall in creating the document, we can assume that they were aware
of this point: the separation of the work from its copyright had been
made because of a practical, not a jurisprudential, concern. The separation was necessary if the statutory copyright was to be only a limited
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
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monopoly and still succeed as a trade-regulation device. The booksellers had recognized this point immediately, and it had provided them
with the incentive to seek to eliminate the distinction in order to destroy the efficacy of statutory copyright as a trade-regulation concept.
Thanks to the booksellers, then, statutory copyright was corrupted almost from its beginning. Thus, it is significant that the drafters of the
Copyright Clause, presumably aware of the booksellers' efforts,
reached back to the Statute of Anne for language that empowered
Congress to grant copyright only in its pure, not its adulterated, form.
IV.

THE CORRUPTION OF COPYRIGHT

The corruption of copyright is the treatment of a work and its
copyright as a single property, which effects a change in perception:
copyright ceases to be a limited statutory monopoly and becomes an
author's property right.
To the perceiver, of course, perception is reality, and part of the
confusion in copyright law results from the lack of congruence between
the law as it was perceived to be and what it was in fact.30 The result,
over a period of time, has been the inversion of the ideas of monopoly
and property, a process aided by the use of legal fictions.
A.

The Inversion of Ideas: Monopoly and Property

The concern in this section is the development of the notion that
copyright is essentially an author's natural-law property right. Since
the notion has support in the Copyright Clause, it will be useful to
trace the idea to its source, the Statute of Anne, and correct a common
misconception.
The misconception that copyright is primarily an author's right is
based on two impeccable propositions: (1) copyright requires the creation of a work; and (2) authors are the persons who create works. The
conclusion follows, however, only if reward to the author is the primary
justification for copyright. But an analysis of the Statute of Anne tells
us this is not so. In short, while benefitting the author, the condition
that the author create a work in order to obtain a copyright was an
anti-monopolistic provision that created the public domain. Thus limiting the copyright to the author meant that copyright could not be used
to capture works in the public domain, and, the limited term of copyright meant that all works would eventually go into the public domain.
Moreover, statutory copyright was limited to the author who published

30. Feist presents an example of this incongruence. The Supreme Court held the sweat-ofthe-brow doctrine, long accepted by several lower courts, to be Unconstitutional. Feist PublicaPublished
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a work, a condition that prevented copyright from being used as a de31
vice of censorship.
Apparently, however, copyright was imported into the United
States without any clear notion of whether its jurisprudential basis was
the grant of a limited statutory monopoly or the natural-law property
right of the author. If queried, most persons probably would have opted
for the natural-law property right of the author, both because monopoly is a socially undesirable evil and because the author's property right
is an appealing idea in that it represents a reward for effort. But in
truth it is not likely that much thought was given to the issue, although
there was a large amount of copyright legislation in the early United
States. Twelve of the thirteen states enacted copyright statutes during
the era of the Articles of Confederation, and Congress enacted the first
federal copyright statute in 1790.32
The present concern, however, is the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution, and the best test for determining that is whether our conclusions are consistent with the goals the Framers almost surely had in
mind. One of those goals was freedom of speech, another the promotion
of learning. Given these two goals, one can reasonably conclude that
the Framers of the Constitution viewed copyright only as the grant of a
limited statutory monopoly to encourage authors to publish their
writings.
The English experience with copyright as a property right of the
publisher in the form of the stationers' copyright is evidence, circumstantial though it is, of this concern. Other evidence is the exclusion of
publishers from the Copyright Clause, an exclusion that is significant
in view of a 1783 resolution of the Continental Congress recommending
that states provide copyright for authors or publishers.3" (James
Madison, who may well have drafted the Copyright Clause, was a
member of the committee that drafted the resolution.)
And, indeed, the limited monopoly view is supported by the first
authoritative jurisprudential exposition of copyright theory in this
country, Wheaton v. Peters, 4 the Supreme Court's first copyright case,
decided in 1834. The Court in Wheaton was given a choice of either

31. The author's "right" in his or her works, of course, arose from the fact of creation. And
had the author's interest been a primary concern, law makers would have recognized that copyright was to be distinguished from the work and that the author's conveyance of the copyright was
not a conveyance of the work itself. Had this been done, common law courts could have developed
a law of moral rights.
32. Copyright Act, ch. 15, I Stat. 124 (1790).
33. Resolution of the Continental Congress, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, Laws
Passed in the United States Since 1783 Relating to Copyright, C. 0. Bull. No.3 (Revised) 1
(1973).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
34. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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the positive-law/statutory-grant theory or the natural-law/property
theory of copyright, and chose the former. In so doing, the Court was
being true to the Statute of Anne, which had arrived in this country in
the form of the 1790 Copyright Act, and also, of course, to the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
For the most part, the positive-law/statutory theory prevailed in
the nineteenth century, although the notion that copyright was a property of the author also persisted.35 The intermingling of the positivelaw/natural-law ideas makes it difficult to assess their influence at any
particular time, but as the current century has progressed, the influence
of the natural-law theory has increased, so that what began as a monopoly in the latter part of the eighteenth century has come to be
have
viewed as property in the latter part of the twentieth. Thus, we 36
copyright.
of
theories
property
and
the inversion of the monopoly
The perception of copyright as an author's property right facilitated the use of legal fictions. (The use of a legal fiction to protect
property is acceptable, but not to protect a monopoly.) And, in turn,
the use of the fictions facilitated the proprietary perception.
B.

The Role of Fictions

Fictions have been so much a part of copyright jurisprudence and
have made such a large contribution to the corruption of copyright that
it will be useful to provide an overview of their use in the United
States. If the term "writings" in the Copyright Clause means the product of an author's efforts, Congress' use of fictions in the copyright statute can be said to have begun with its first, the Copyright Act of 1790,

35. Justice Story, in Folsom v. Marsh, for example, enhanced the copyright monopoly in
the name of author's rights by creating the fair-use doctrine to supersede the abridgment doctrine.
9 F. Cas. 342, (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). On the other hand, just past the turn of the
century in 1908, the Supreme Court in White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company gave the copyright owner's rights a very narrow reading in holding that a recording of a
musical composition on a pianola role was not a copy, and therefore not an infringement. 209 U.S.
1, 17-18 (1908).
36. Congress and the courts must share the credit or blame for expanding the copyright
monopoly, but the most significant expansion may well have been legislative. In the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress added the right "to copy" to the copyright owner's rights to print, reprint,
publish and vend the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909) (repealed 1978). The addition of the
right to copy was almost surely intended to apply only to works of art. L. Ray Patterson, Free
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1,passim (1987). But the language did not
so indicate, and it is easy to see how the right to copy expanded the notion of copyright as a
property right encompassing both the work and its copyright.
It is one thing to have the exclusive right to publish a book; it is another to have the exclusive
right to copy itin any form. Thus copyright for books had traditionally been only for printed
books. Since the rights were to print, reprint, publish and vend the book, one infringed the book
only by these acts. But if the rights included also the right to copy the book, one could infringe the
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in which maps and (marine) charts were given copyright protection as
well as books. Thus land surveyors and mariners became "authors,"
demonstrating that the neo-copyright has a long lineage.
The trend toward expanding the subject matter of copyright has
proceeded both with amendments to the statute and as a part of each
of the four major revisions of the copyright act, in 1831, 31 1870,36
1909,11 and 1976.40 In 1802 Congress made prints and engravings the
subject of copyright protection,"' and in the 1831 Revision Act musical
compositions were added to the copyright repertoire. 2 In 1856 an
amendment added dramas (and the right to perform them publicly),"'
in 1865 another amendment added photographs, 4 and the 1870 Revision Act gave copyright protection to works of art, including paintings,
drawings, and statues." The 1909 Revision Act provided copyrighi protection for "all the writings of an author," and the classification of
works for registration included eleven classes. In 1912 an amendment
added copyright for motion pictures,' and in 1971 another amendment
provided copyright protection for sound recordings. "7 The 1976 Act
provides copyright for all "original works of authorship," and includes
compilations and derivative works."'
While the extension of copyright to photographs can be said to be
the first example of copyright applied to the product of a new technology, photographs are analogous to prints and paintings. With this exception, the expansion of copyright in terms of subject matter until
1909 was in the normal progression of events apart from technological
developments. The passage of time and logic ensured the expansion of
copyright from books to music and art. Thus, one would be hard
pressed to argue that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in
using legal fictions to extend copyright to art in the form of graphics
and three dimensional objects and to musical compositions as well as to
literature in the form of writings.

37. Copyright Act, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436-39 (1831) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988)).
38. Copyright Act, ch. 230, §§ 85-111, 16 Stat. 212-17 (1870) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909) (repealed 1978).
40. Copyright Act, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
41. Copyright Act, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171-72 (1802).
42. Copyright Act, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436-439 (1870).
43. Copyright Act, ch. 169, It Stat. 138-39 (1856).
44. Copyright Act, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540-41 (1865).
45. Copyright Act, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 212-17 (1976).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
47. Id.
48. Id. §§ 102(a), 103.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
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The fictions used to extend copyright protection to these works can
be called congruent fictions. They result from giving to "authors" an
expanded definition as creative individuals, and "writings" an expanded
definition as creative products. This expansion of copyright is thus consistent with the constitutional goal of promoting learning, since visual
artists and composers are no less important for culture than authors.
The same cannot be said for the work-for-hire doctrine by reason
of which an employer is deemed to be the author of a work, which is an
incongruent fiction first codified in the 1909 Act. There is no basis for
concluding that granting the copyright to an employer is either necessary or desirable for the promotion of learning. The law of assignment
makes it unnecessary, and the monopolistic tendency of corporations
makes the corporate copyright an undesirable vehicle for learning.4 9
By the time of the 1976 Act, the use of fictions had become so
common that Congress generalized them. Thus, "writings" became
"original works of authorship"; the performance right was transformed
into the performance copyright; and the work-for-hire doctrine was
broadened to encompass any person for whom the work was prepared
as well as the employer. These three fictions are the foundation for the
neo-copyrights for television broadcasts, for computer databases, and
for computer programs.
V.

THE NEO-COPYRIGHT AND TRADE REGULATION

No one can reasonably dispute that the neo-copyright is a part of
American copyright jurisprudence: compulsory licenses are neo-copyrights; copyrights for live television broadcasts are neo-copyrights;
copyrights for computer databases containing factual material are neocopyrights. Nor can one reasonably dispute that the three conditions
giving rise to the neo-copyrights in the twentieth century are similar to
-conditions that gave rise to the stationers' copyright in the sixteenth
century: new technology (the printing press in earlier times, television
and computers in modern times); a concentration of economic power
(the Stationers' Company and media conglomerates); and a desire for
information control (in the sixteenth century by the government to protect its power; in this century by media conglomerates to protect their
profits). The analogy also applies in relation to the efforts of the booksellers in the eighteenth century to get courts to override the statutory
copyright with the common-law proprietary copyright. Today, copy-

49. Perhaps corporate copyright by assignment would result in the same effects as a corporate copyright by initial ownership, but the fact is that the latter deprives the real author-the
named beneficiary in the copyright clause-of a real benefit. Indeed, because the fiction makes
copyright available to one other than the author, by any measure of logic, it is unconstitutional.
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right owners are seeking to override the statutory copyright with judicial rulings granting copyright owners plenary property rights contrary
to the Constitution.
In this, their ally is the statute itself. The thesis that the infirm
intellectual foundation of copyright law derives from confusion about
the relationship of a work and its copyright demonstrates the point.
The 1976 Act, albeit unwittingly, compounds the confusion because it
provides copyright protection for three kinds of works: original works of
authorship, derivative works, and compilations. Derivative works and
compilation material are not owned by the derivative author or the
compiler. Therefore, absent a declaration by Congress, neither rights in
the derived work nor the compilation could exist. And even Congress
has decreed that for the latter two, copyright can protect only the new
matter they contain.
The limited copyright protection given to derivative works and
compilations is an effort to avoid the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine that
Feist declared to be unconstitutional. 50 My point is threefold. First, as
to low authorship works-compilations and derivative works-the 1976
Act is intended to function only as a trade regulation statute. Second,
the subtleties involved are too great for this approach to work effectively because the copyright fictions obscure them. Thus, an employer
for hire can be an author; copyright protects only original works of
authorship; and the recording of a live television broadcast results in
the writing of an author. Since the fictions are not subtle, there is no
reason to assume that they reflect a subtle concern for the monopolistic
tendencies of copyright.
Third, and most important, neither the derivative copyright nor
the compilation copyright is necessary to protect the writings of the
author. A work directly derived from a copyrighted work, for example,
a motion picture based on a novel, should be an infringement of the
novel, even without the derivative copyright. The same is true of a compilation that is a collective work, for example, an anthology of short
stories, for the copyright of the works that are compiled provides protection. And if the compilation is merely a data compilation containing
no originality, for example, telephone directory white pages, it is not
protected at all.

50. The theory here, apparently, is that the compilation copyright, for example, protects the
packaging, but not its contents. The point has more implications than may first appear. Thus, if
copyright protects only the work as a whole, it does not protect the material contained therein,
and the right to use the work to prepare derivative works is not applicable. Moreover, when copying the contents, it should not be necessary to resort to fair use, because that doctrine is applicable
only if the material copied is copyrighted.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9
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By combining the protection of low authorship works with the protection of high authorship works, Congress has provided more protection for the former, and less protection for the latter, than is appropriate. This point is perhaps best exemplified by the claim that copyright
does not interfere with free speech rights. If one proceeds from the premise that copyright protects only wholly original works, that is true.
There is no free speech right to another's creative efforts. But the premise is inappropriately used to apply to all copyrighted works, for example, compilations that are news stories, the control of which surely
does involve free speech considerations. The problem is essentially that
of providing the rewards of copyright for creative works to low authorship works by equating the neo-copyright with copyright.
Since the problems arising from the neo-copyright are a product of
copyright's infirm intellectual foundation, which in turn is a product of
history, we can look backward in order to see forward and assess the
proposed solution. The object of attention, of course, is the early eighteenth century solution to similar problems,' the Statute of Anne. That
statute was intended to accomplish three goals: (1) to destroy and prevent the recurrence of a monopoly of the booktrade; (2) to prevent the
use of copyright as a device of censorship; and (3) to protect the consumer's right of access to printed books. The limited terms of copyright
accomplished the first goal. The requirement of a new work accomplished the second goal and a price-control provision was directed to
the third.
Several principles derived from that statute are applicable for designing a trade-regulation statute for neo-copyright: the protection
should be for a limited time (and far less than a century); it should be
only against competitors; it should not encompass the contents of the
work; and the protection should be subject to forfeiture for predatory
pricing. This suggestion of sui generis protection is not without modern
precedent, for Congress utilized it for the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984.1
There is, however, an apparent dilemma and a manifest irony
here. The apparent dilemma is this: if we remove the neo-copyright
from the copyright statute and provide limited protection for such
works, by implication we leave the swollen monopoly of copyright for
the writings of authors. The conclusion, however, does not necessarily
follow. The primary reason for the bloated copyright monopoly in the
first place is the use of legal fictions necessary to accommodate neocopyrights. By removing these fictions, we return to copyright in its
unadulterated, constitutional form.
U.S.C. §§ 901-14
51. by17eCommons,
Published
1991(1988).

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:2

The irony raises a more serious issue. The irony is in the suggestion that Congress use the statute that was almost surely the source for
the Copyright Clause as a model for contemporary legislation to overcome the limitations on its power imposed by the clause. In other
words, can Congress enact legislation for neo-copyrights in view of the
limitations the Copyright Clause imposes, as well as Feist's ruling that
protection is not available for factual material?
There are several responses to the concern. First, a neo-copyright
is not a copyright any more'than the common-law copyright is a copyright; second, Justice O'Connor's context in Feist was the Copyright
Act, not the Copyright Clause; and, finally, to say that Congress cannot enact such legislation is to say that one provision of the Constitution (the Copyright Clause) preempts another (the Commerce Clause).
The real danger is that corporate lobbyists would influence the
proposed legislation to such an extent that the cure would be worse
than the evil. 52 But against this there is protection in the Constitution.
Since most of the material involved will be factual and informational,
too great a monopoly provided by congressional action would probably
run afoul of the First Amendment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The purpose here has been to present ideas, not a complete proposal. The main idea is that a federal trade-regulation statute unburdened by the baggage of copyright history could be used to provide the
minimal protection that sweat-of-the brow efforts merit. By minimal
protection, I mean protection against competitors, but not against consumers, and protection against the appropriation of the work as a
whole, but not against the use of the contents to create another work.
In essence, we would return to copyright principles that existed when
copyright was recognized as the grant of a limited statutory monopoly-that is, as a trade regulation concept.
My position is neither that neo-copyright entrepreneurs are unworthy of legal protection for their industriousness nor that they do not
serve a useful function. But they should, and must, look to the market
for their rewards without the legal subsidy of copyright law to ensure
their profits. For the subsidy is too expensive in terms of the constitutional right to use copyrighted materials for learning.
The reason to be concerned about the state of copyright law today
is relatively simple. The principle subject of copyright has come to be
not the writings of authors, but information from the public domain.
52.

Professor Jessica Litman has made the danger apparent. Jessica Litman, Copyright
REv. 275 (1989).

Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/9

19921

COPYRIGHT OVEREXTENDED

As such, it presents grave dangers to two fundamentals of a free society: freedom of speech and the rule of law.
The threat that a fiction-bound copyright law poses to free speech
is, I think, obvious. The threat that it poses to the rule of law is not, for
we continually ignore the essential of that idea. That essential is integrity, the proper interrelationship of the parts to each other and to the
whole. When we introduce fictions into a body of law, we begin to destroy that integrity. When that integrity is gone, the rule of law ceases
and the rule of man (and woman) begins.
What is involved here is not merely the integrity of a small body
of law, but of the Constitution of the United States. Our right to read a
particular book, to see a- particular television newscast, or to copy a
particular article from a periodical free of burdensome use taxes, is a
small right in the larger scheme of things. But if we do not take care of
the small rights, we will undermine and eventually forfeit the large.
This is the ultimate lesson of Feist. And as the Supreme Court continues to clear copyright law of fictions such as the sweat-of-the-brow, it
will place copyright on a firm intellectual foundation, which will necessarily exclude neo-copyrights. ,
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